Dictionary Article

The means by which one nation seeks to impose its will upon another by force. An index to the importance of warfare in antiquity is provided by the amount of technical skill directed to perfecting devices for destruction and defense.

Cavalry units were introduced at the close of the second millennium BC and the beginning of the first. The cavalry charge provided a shock force to the great armies, and the cavalry’s mobility permitted concentration of firepower at decisive points. When the Assyrians coordinated their infantry, cavalry, and chariot corps into a powerful battle machine, smaller neighboring nations were more and more compelled to retreat behind their fortifications. They could not hope to engage the massive Assyrian army in standard combat in open terrain. No period is richer in illustrated monuments than Iron Age II; the Assyrian war reliefs present detailed illustrations of their conquests and the size of fortified cities. The few scenes depicting standard combat in open terrain show chariots charging from all directions and engaging the enemy at all stages of a battle. Other formations carry out mopping-up operations, finishing off pockets of enemy resistance remaining after the chariot charge.

The factor of terrain was always very important. In standard combat on open terrain it became conventional to place the best troops on the right side of the line. A Greek commander, Epaminodas (d. 362 BC), introduced the variant of a slanting attack by a strengthened left wing, taking the Spartan army completely by surprise. Philip of Macedon and his son Alexander continued to surprise their enemies with variations on a plan of attack based on the phalanx.

During certain periods in the ancient Near East, the duel presented an alternative to standard combat. The duel was a contest between two champions who represented the contending forces. The two armies would agree in advance to abide by the outcome of the fight. The duel was meant to avoid the heavy casualties of full-scale warfare. The earliest detailed written account of this unique form of warfare occurs in the Tale of Sinuhe. A chamberlain in the royal court of the 12th dynasty, Sinuhe voluntarily went into exile and traveled to northern Palestine and Syria, where he lived among Semitic tribes. There he was challenged to a duel by a local champion, whom he defeated and whose goods he then plundered.

Although the duel was common among other armies in subsequent periods, it was evidently unknown to Israel before the encounter between David and Goliath (1 Sm 17). The Philistine army had penetrated Judah as far as Socoh and were arrayed on one hill. Drawn up against them on an opposite hill was the army of Saul. The valley of Elah separated the two camps. The Israelites were challenged daily by the Philistine champion, Goliath, who proposed that the battle be decided through combat between two warriors. David accepted his proposal, but when he killed Goliath, the Philistines fled, unwilling to honor the terms of the prior agreement. The Israelite army then entered the contest, pursuing the Philistines and inflicting heavy casualties.

Most cities in the ancient Near East were located at sites that could be defended against attack and that possessed economic advantages. An assault on a fortified city presented opposite problems for attacker and defender. The actions of one were a direct response to the actions of the other. Systems of defense were intended to thwart methods of attack, which in turn were designed to penetrate systems of defense.

There were five possible ways of conquering a fortified city: penetration from above the fortifications; direct penetration through the fortifications; penetration from below the fortifications; siege; and penetration by ruse. On many occasions, a combination of two or more methods was necessary to breach the defensive network.

The biblical narrative of the conquest of Shechem by Abimelech (Jgs 9) gives an account of an assault on a fortified city in the period of the judges (Iron Age I). When the people of Shechem and their allies rebelled against Abimelech, he retaliated by attacking the city, advancing his army of mercenaries by night and launching an assault from ambush positions at dawn (9:32-35). The men of Shechem engaged in open battle outside the city gates but were forced to retreat behind the security of the city walls. The next day Abimelech directed his assault against the city itself. Dividing his forces into three groups, he assumed direct command of one, which he committed to an attack on the city gates at the decisive moment of battle (vv 43-44). The gate was breached and the main walls seized, but the city’s surviving defenders fled to an inner citadel, the temple of Baal-berith.

Many reliefs depict groups of soldiers defending an inner citadel after a city’s wall was breached. Archaeological excavations at Shechem confirm that its temple, like those in other Canaanite cities, was built in the form of a fortified tower, supported by stout bastions near the entrance. The tower of Shechem was thus strongly fortified and occupied only a small area, enabling its defenders to concentrate their firepower on Abimelech’s troops. Since it could not be taken by storm, Abimelech ordered his soldiers to use their battle-axes to cut brushwood, which was piled against the stronghold and set on fire (Jgs 9:48-49). All of the defenders within the tower died.

An assault on an inner citadel was always a hazardous undertaking for an attacking army, as shown in the sequel to the capture of Shechem’s tower. Abimelech turned his attention next to the city of Thebez and followed the same plan of assault that had proved successful at Shechem. But as he was preparing to burn the door of the tower to which the defenders had fled, his skull was crushed by a piece of millstone dropped on him by a woman (Jgs 9:50-53). The incident was remembered and became proverbial for the danger of approaching too closely the walls of a fortified tower (2 Sm 11:19-21).

From the patriarchal period (middle Bronze period), we have detailed written information on the use of communications systems in wartime. The documents from Mari on the Euphrates provide evidence for a well-developed communications system based on signaling. Signals were flashed by torches or firebrands at night in accordance with a prearranged code. The system was widely used in Mesopotamia and elsewhere to call for immediate help when a city was under attack.

In the late Bronze period horsemen were sometimes employed for isolated communication functions. Intelligence services played a role in planning and executing military operations. The importance of intelligence and the use of spies or scouts is stressed in the biblical accounts of the conquest of the land of Canaan. Before entering the land, Moses sent men on an espionage mission. He instructed them to gather information on the topography of the land, to observe the relative strength of its inhabitants, to determine whether the land was fertile, to survey the cities and see if they were fortified, and to report on the character of the land—whether it was capable of sustaining a large population (Nm 13:17-20).

Tactical intelligence was very important. Joshua dispatched spies to Jericho and to Ai before beginning military operations against them (Jos 2:1; 7:2). The reports he received about the offensive spirit and strength of the Canaanites enabled him to formulate an attack plan. In the period of the judges the conquest of Bethel (Jgs 1:22-26) was due directly to intelligence gathered by a reconnaissance patrol. The tribes of Joseph sent out scouts to keep the city under observation. It was strongly fortified and seemed impregnable. The scouts captured a man who emerged from the city—presumably not through the main gate, which was shut tight, but through a concealed postern or tunnel. In exchange for his own life and the safety of his family, he disclosed the location of the passage leading beneath the walls. The city was penetrated through the tunnel and captured.

Direct penetration through the fortifications of an ancient city meant breaching the gate or the main walls by using hammers, axes, pikes, spears, swords, or a battering ram. Illustrated monuments and written documents indicate that early in the middle Bronze period fortified cities were being attacked with battering rams. The earliest known illustration of a ram appears in a siege scene in the wall paintings from Beni Hasan (20th century BC). The ram pictured is a relatively simple device, consisting of a hutlike structure with a slightly pointed roof, which could be moved near a fortress with the help of two parallel crossbars. The structure provided cover for two or three soldiers who operated by hand a very long pole with a sharp tip, presumably of metal.

The Mari documents provide information for the period 200 years later. They mention the effectiveness of battering rams constructed largely of wood. Although very heavy, the siege weapon could be moved over long distances. One document speaks of the use of a wagon drawn by draft animals and of a boat to transport a battering ram to the site of a besieged city.

Moving a battering ram into position always exposed the demolition unit to heavy fire from defenders on the walls above them. Its heaviness made it cumbersome to move. Moreover, the ground adjacent to the walls was usually rough, rocky, and steep. When the chosen point of penetration was a section of the wall, an assault force had to construct an earthen ramp, occasionally strengthened on the top surface and sides with wooden planks or stones. The ramp provided a track along which the battering ram could be moved from the foot of the slope to the outer wall. Once moved into operational position, the ram had to be braked to prevent it from rolling back. The building of such a ramp was evidently necessary in Joab’s campaign against the fortified city of Abel in Beth-maacah (2 Sm 20:15). The biblical account indicates that some sort of battering ram was in use in Israel under King David during the early monarchy.

The earliest Assyrian reliefs show that protection of the penetration units was a major consideration. High, mobile assault towers constructed of wood operated in tandem with a battering ram. Such towers, moved into position near a breach operation and manned by archers, provided covering fire directed against the defenders on the wall. Siege towers neutralized the defenders’ advantage in firepower and drew fire away from the crew engaged in breaching the walls.

The details of the Assyrian reliefs make it possible to visualize clearly the fate of Jerusalem, as announced to the prophet Ezekiel (Ez 4:1-3; 21:22). The gate was the focal point of attack because it was the weakest point in the wall. Moreover, the path leading up to the gate made construction of a special ramp unnecessary. In the demolition of a gate, swords were sometimes used to pry the doors loose and to tear down hinges. Wooden doors unprotected by metal were often set on fire.

The battering ram continued to be used as an engine for breaching walls in the Hellenistic-Roman period. In 63 BC the Roman commander Pompey brought up battering rams from Tyre against the defenders of Jerusalem, and with them penetrated the fortified wall that enclosed the temple. The siege machine shown on Trajan’s column had a beam with an iron head shaped like a ram. It was moved up to a wall in a frame protected by a wooden roof covered with clay or hides. A variation equipped for boring into a wall was used by Titus when besieging Jerusalem in AD 70.

The battering ram was not the only device used to effect a breach in a wall. Troops trained as sappers would tear down a section of the wall by using sharp-headed levers (pikes, swords, spears) or even sledgehammers (cf. Ez 26:8-9). In Ashurnasirpal’s army such men were issued full-length coats of mail to cover their whole bodies. Under later Assyrian kings, they were protected by both round and rectangular shields, which they carried on their backs when engaged in demolition. Later, Ashurbanipal relied exclusively on such sappers for direct penetration of a fortified city. He designed for their protection a huge shield, the curved head of which could be propped against the wall, screening the sapper from missiles while he worked beneath it.

A battle scene depicted on limestone in the tomb of Anta at Dashashe in Upper Egypt (24th century BC) provides the earliest known representation of siege activities. It shows the Egyptians raising a scaling ladder against the walls of a fortified city. By the time of Sargon, the thickness of walls was increased considerably, which permitted construction of much higher walls, more resistant to scaling. Such solid, massive walls also tended to blunt the effectiveness of a battering ram. Sargon, and especially his successor Ashurbanipal, responded by constructing longer scaling ladders, some of which could reach a height of from 25 to 30 feet (7.6 to 9.1 meters), judging from the number of rungs.

A tunneling operation could be started beyond the range of any weapons at the disposal of the defenders. Once underground, the penetration unit was shielded from enemy fire. The tunneling could be accomplished under cover of night, so that the element of surprise could be exploited to the maximum. It was, however, a lengthy process requiring considerable technical skill. Moreover, if the operation was detected by the defenders before its completion, they could destroy the penetration unit as it emerged from the tunnel. Attempts to penetrate fortified cities by tunneling beneath the walls was a characteristic feature of warfare in Iron Age II. That is confirmed by reliefs, written documents, and archaeological excavation of sites dating to this period, where the remains of attack tunnels have been discovered.

Particularly when a walled city was situated on a high hill, an extended siege provided an alternate method of conquering it. By encircling the city and preventing aid or supplies from reaching its defenders, the attacking army could starve the inhabitants out. That procedure minimized the element of risk for the attacking army. Its success depended upon their capacity to prevent outside assistance from reaching the city and the defenders from leaving it. An army would generally resort to siege when a city’s fortifications were too powerful for direct penetration. The siege of Samaria by the Assyrians lasted for three years (2 Kgs 18:9-10).

The peculiar conditions of siege produced the catapult, a major innovation of Greek artillery and a logical improvement on the bow and the sling. Designed originally as a strengthened bow mounted on a stand and used to fire arrows only, it was introduced around 400 BC by Demetrius I. He may have borrowed the idea from the Phoenicians at Carthage.

In the course of time the instrument was improved. The perfect weapon, called the torsion catapult, derived its power from many tightly twisted strands of elastic material, frequently supplied by women’s hair, which could be tightened with a windlass and then released suddenly. Firing arrows, large stones, or fire-baskets with an effective range of 200 yards (182.9 meters), a catapult could clear a wall of its defenders while a battering ram breached it or a boarding party attacked from a mobile tower.

For those in a besieged city, the critical problems were food and water supplies. The horror of famine is stressed in the biblical account of the siege of Samaria by the Syrian Ben-hadad in the days of the prophet Elisha. On that occasion women were reduced to eating their children (2 Kgs 6:26-29). A besieging army would do everything in its power to aggravate such conditions. In one of the siege reliefs of Ashurnasirpal II, a defender has lowered a bucket from the wall to draw water from a stream below; an Assyrian soldier is shown cutting the rope with his dagger.

Various ruses and stratagems could draw the defenders out of a city or infiltrate troops into the city. If a small force could enter a city by a cunning stratagem, it could overpower the guards and open the city gates to an attacking army. A city’s fortifications were of little value once an enemy had entered the city. Moreover, penetrating a city’s defenses at any one point frequently caused the entire defense system to collapse. The story of the Trojan horse is probably the most celebrated account of a stratagem circumventing the defense of a strongly fortified ancient city.

In the biblical account of the siege of Samaria by Ben-hadad, a sudden lifting of the Syrian siege led Joram, the king of Israel, to suspect a ruse. He refused to believe the report of four lepers that the Syrians had gone, leaving behind large food supplies (2 Kgs 7:12). That was the same kind of tactic that Joshua had employed at Ai (Jos 8:3-8).

On other occasions, powerful armies sought to break down resistance by psychological warfare, as in the unsuccessful attempt by Sennacherib to capture Jerusalem in the time of Hezekiah (2 Kgs 18–19). The dialogue between the Assyrian general and Hezekiah’s delegates reveals that the Assyrian was trying to shake the confidence of the city’s defenders.

The ambush was a type of ruse used to trap and destroy an enemy at a moment when he was least able to counter a sudden, unexpected blow. Its effectiveness depended almost entirely on the element of surprise. By taking advantage of good intelligence, knowledge of the terrain, and the cover of night, a small force could stage a devastating ambush against vastly superior numbers.

The ambush was a standard method of combat during the period of the conquest of Canaan. The fall of Ai, for example, was due directly to the tactical success of an ambush (Jos 8:1-23). Under cover of night, Joshua was able to move a large force to a concealed position behind the city. He then led the remainder of the Israelite army to the edge of a valley north of the fortified city, giving the appearance of a planned assault on the city. The diversion, as calculated, drew the main force of Ai away from the city to engage Israel on the plain of Arabah. When the Israelites fell back, appearing to be badly beaten, the remaining defenders of the city were summoned to pursue Joshua’s fleeing army. With the city left undefended, the main Israelite strike force rose from its ambush position, poured into the city, and set it on fire. Too late, the men of Ai saw the smoke from their burning city and realized the stratagem. Joshua’s army turned to counterattack their pursuers, who found themselves trapped between two bodies of Israelite forces. Assaulted from both front and rear, the king of Ai’s army was annihilated, victim of an effectively laid ambush.

The earliest known fortifications in the world, dated by some to about 7000 BC, were discovered in 1954 at Jericho. They were impressive in conception and construction. The core of the defense system was a wall, part of which, bordering the western edge of the ancient city, was still standing to a height of 21 feet (6.4 meters). Further excavation uncovered a large moat that had been carved out of solid rock at the base of the wall, 27 feet (8.2 meters) wide and 9 feet (2.7 meters) deep. How that feat was accomplished when the only tools assumed to have been available were made of stone is a complete mystery. A third component of Jericho’s defense system was a huge stone circular tower 30 feet (9.1 meters) high, once evidently attached to the inner side of the western part of the wall. The exact purpose of the tower has not yet been determined, but Neolithic Jericho provides the earliest evidence of a fortified city supported by a wall, tower, and moat.

By the middle Bronze period, there were four components in a standard defense system: a moat, an advance (outer) wall, the main (inner) wall, and a well-fortified gate structure. The moat, advance wall, and subsidiary fortifications protecting the steep slope and lower portion of the main wall were intended to prevent breaching by a battering ram.

Erection of a simple wall could halt a hostile advance only temporarily, since walls could be scaled or breached. Walls therefore provided a firing platform so defenders could repel attacks. The wall system consisted of three principal components: the wall itself, constituting the barrier; an upper structure, which provided the firing platform and cover for the defenders; and a series of obstacles and traps erected in front of the wall to keep archers at a distance and to prevent operation of a battering ram.

The battlement—a parapet built along the outer top edge of the wall—provided the defenders with a measure of security, freedom for mobility, and openings through which fire could be directed. From a distance the square notches looked like a row of teeth with gaps between them. The teeth, called merlons, provided a protective barrier against hostile missiles. The gaps, called embrasures or crenels, supplied openings through which the defenders could discharge their weapons. Special towers protruded from the outer face of the wall, spaced at a distance no greater than the double range of a bow. Such towers enabled the defenders to fire at troops who managed to reach the walls. One way of protecting the main wall was to construct an outer or advance wall that could be breached or climbed only under heavy fire from defending units on the battlements of the main wall. Another method was to dig a wide, deep moat around the base of the main wall. A moat kept the enemy from using a battering ram unless they could bridge the moat or fill it up at certain points, under concentrated fire from the defenders.

Casemate fortifications, introduced in the middle Bronze period, were developed from double walls built of dressed stones. The space between the walls was divided into chambers, or casemates, used for storage or dwellings. The Hittite casemate system, introduced into Palestine at least as early as the time of Saul, was widely adopted in Syria and Palestine. A fine example has been discovered at Gibeah, where Saul’s citadel was located, dating to the end of the 11th century BC. The overall thickness of the double walls, including the casemates, reaches 15 feet (4.6 meters). The same type of construction has been found in excavations of three Solomonic cities—Hazor, Gezer, and Megiddo (cf. 1 Kgs 9:15)—where the casemate walls have an overall thickness of 18 feet (5.5 meters).

Although the divided kingdoms of Judah and Israel were not noted for technical advancements in offensive warfare, a number of their kings worked at improving fortifications and means of defense. Uzziah was especially remembered for his accomplishments in defensive warfare. Along with other measures, “he produced machines mounted on the walls of Jerusalem, designed by brilliant men to shoot arrows and hurl stones from the towers and the corners of the wall” (2 Chr 26:15, NLT). Those “machines” were special protective structures built to facilitate the task of the archers and to permit huge stones to be dropped on the heads of assaulting troops.

It was inevitable that the gate would be the focus of action in any assault on a fortified city. City gates were therefore designed to expose an attacking army to the greatest risk while providing maximum security to the defenders. The road approaching a city on a hill would wind up the slope, climbing obliquely to the left or the right. Such roads were usually laid out to reach the gate from the right, so an attacker would have to expose the right side of his body to the defenders on the wall. Since he carried his shield in his left hand, that made him more vulnerable.

To prevent the heavy wooden doors of the gate from being set on fire, they were usually plated with metal. A gate wide enough for chariots required double doors, making the line at the center where the two doors met the weakest point in the barrier. Double doors were therefore fitted with huge bolts and fortified with a heavy beam running across the back of both door panels and held in place by sockets set in the doorposts.

Another component in the defense complex at a gate consisted of towers erected on either side of the gate and protruding from the outer face of the wall. Enemy soldiers trying to smash the doors with axes or set them on fire with torches were thus exposed to heavy flanking fire from defensive units on the towers. From a roof over the gate having a balcony, concentrated firepower could be poured down on attackers’ heads. The addition of such auxiliary structures transformed a gate into a small fortress.

A major weakness of a city’s walls and gate was the magnitude of the circumference. An average-size city might have a perimeter of half a mile (.8 kilometer); a larger city, a perimeter of over a mile (1.6 kilometers). Yet the entire wall had to be defended against breaching, scaling, or tunneling. An attacking army would use diversionary tactics to keep defenders dispersed along the entire perimeter but concentrate their primary assault at one point in the wall. Once the wall was breached, perimeter fortifications served no further defensive purpose. Therefore, internal walls were often added to subdivide a city into several sections, each capable of independent defense. Also, on the highest point of land within the city a citadel would be constructed as a self-contained defensive unit.

The earliest examples of such fortifications, called migdols, are found in the late Bronze Age. They were originally small citadels built to guard important military targets such as sources of water, strategic routes, cultivated farmlands, or frontiers. A migdol of that type was discovered in Israel, not far from Ashdod, in 1960. It was square in plan, with rectangular bastions, and was two stories high, just like structures depicted in Egyptian reliefs from the same period. The same design was used to fortify temples inside of cities. Such fortified temples served as places of refuge and as a city’s final defense once its walls had been breached (cf. Jgs 9:45-51).

In a later period an inner citadel could embrace a complex consisting of the fortified palace of the governor, dwellings of his chief ministers, and sometimes the temple. Such citadels resembled fortified cities, possessing a main wall, a gateway, an outer wall, and occasionally a moat. Being small in area and heavily fortified, citadels could be defended in a final effort by the governor and remaining inhabitants. Presumably Zimri could have held out against Omri’s army for an extended period in the citadel of Tirzah, had he not committed suicide by setting it on fire (1 Kgs 16:17-18).

Unless provision was made to keep a city’s inhabitants supplied with food and water during a protracted siege, no defense system could be effective. Several Judean kings made efforts to solve the food-storage problem. Rehoboam, for example, fortified a number of cities located on the western, eastern, and southern borders of his kingdom and made them centers for the storage of food, oil, and wine (2 Chr 11:5-11).

Storage of food was easier than storage of water. Cisterns built to collect rainwater were a partial answer, but cisterns often ran dry, particularly in times of drought. Cities were sometimes built on the banks of a stream or river, using the stream as part of the city’s defense system. But for a city built on a hill, the source of water might be a spring located at the foot of the slope and outside the city walls. Sometimes the mouth of the spring could be blocked and its location concealed from the enemy while still allowing access by the inhabitants. At Megiddo a vertical shaft 100 feet (274.3 meters) deep was connected by a horizontal tunnel about 200 feet (548.6 meters) long to the water supply at the western end of the city, beyond the fortifications. The work was undertaken in the time of either Solomon or Ahab.

The most celebrated measures to guarantee a supply of fresh water in a time of siege were those taken by Hezekiah at Jerusalem. That engineering achievement is recalled in all the summaries of his reign, both in the Bible and in the “Praise of Famous Men” in the apocryphal book of Ecclesiasticus (2 Kgs 20:20; 2 Chr 32:30; Ecclus 48:17). The prodigious feat commemorated in those references was the sealing of the spring of Gihon and the cutting of an 1,800-foot (548.6-meter) channel through solid rock in order to bring water into a reservoir in the city. How it was accomplished was reported by Hezekiah himself in the famous Siloam inscription. Two crews, working with hammers, wedges, and pickaxes, began at opposite ends. The crew that began at the spring was able to take advantage of the older tunnel (cf. Is 22:11). They turned due south, in the direction of the city. The other crew, starting from the reservoir, began in a northeasterly direction. They then turned southeast until they reached the north-south line followed by the crew tunneling from the spring, when they turned due north to meet them. The two crews almost passed each other, being about five feet (1.5 meters) apart, but a shout from one was heard through a crevice in the rock by the other. Both parties turned sharply right, and the tunnel was completed. Hezekiah’s precautionary step, taken before Sennacherib’s invasion of Judah, helps to explain why the Assyrians were unable to subdue Jerusalem by the siege tactics that had earlier subdued Samaria in the time of Sargon.

In their exodus from Egypt the Israelites were organized by tribes and divisions. That systematic arrangement for their trek through the wilderness provided a precedent for military organization. After the sojourn at Mt Sinai, the 12 tribes were divided into divisions or army corps, and certain grades in military rank began to appear. The “officers of the army” (Nm 31:14) had command over units of 1,000 or 100 men, which suggests that the tribal army was divided into decimal units. At a later period there is reference to units of 1,000 (the division), 100 (the company), 50 (the platoon), and 10 (the section). Except for the Levites, who were assigned as a tribe to the care of the tabernacle (Nm 2:33), men from 20 years of age who were physically able to fight were assigned to a unit in the tribal army. Certain individuals, however, were exempted from military service (cf. Dt 20:5-9; 24:5; Jgs 7:3).

Until after the conquest of Canaan, the tribal army was essentially a militia recruited in an emergency. Internal organization of the militia was the responsibility of the tribe; each clan and family sent their quota of warriors when summoned to battle by tribal leaders. Because the clan formed the basic unit, recruits were under the command of their own leaders. David’s brothers, for example, served in a division composed of the fighting men from their clan under the command of a captain (1 Sm 17:18; 18:13). When the emergency passed, the militia was disbanded and the soldiers returned to their home districts.

Because the land was divided among the tribes, no tribal or clan leader before Saul commanded the entire tribal confederation (cf. 1 Sm 11:1-11). In fact, tribal jealousies and rivalries threatened national solidarity and jeopardized united action even in a critical period. On some occasions, however, the severity of a crisis caused the armies of the various tribes to unite in common action. The multitribal armies were divided into companies of 1,000, 100, and 50, and still further into families under appointed officers. There is evidence of organization into units according to weaponry (1 Chr 12:24-38). Benjamin’s tribe specialized in the bow and sling. The tribes of Gad, Judah, and Naphtali were expert with the spear and shield.

Provisioning the tribal army was the responsibility of each tribe (Jgs 20:9-10). One out of every ten soldiers was appointed to secure food for the others, either from wealthy landowners (cf. 1 Sm 25) or from the natural resources of the land. In that early stage of military organization, a soldier’s pay generally consisted only of supplies and a portion of the spoils of battle (cf. 30:21-25).

Not until the time of the united monarchy did Israel have a regular army. Transition from a people’s militia to a professional army took place under Saul, whose reign changed the tribal confederacy into a monarchy (1 Sm 13:2). Philistine harassment of Israel encouraged establishment of a strong standing army. The army, however, was not large; it consisted of 3,000 men organized in three formations of 1,000 each (1 Sm 13:2; 24:2). Pay for those career soldiers was sometimes in the form of a land grant (8:14) as well as a share of booty. In the organization of Saul’s army, Abner, Jonathan, and David were given particular responsibilities. Abner was named commander of the army (17:55) and was probably also given direct command of one of the divisions. David’s band of valorous men, “the thirty,” provided the leadership core for his own military organization when he became king.

David continued the practice of maintaining a professional army. But he also developed a national militia of 12 regiments, each being called up for duty for one month of the year under professional officers (1 Chr 27:1-15). Each regiment, recruited across tribal lines, consisted of 24,000 soldiers. David’s innovation provided him with a large reserve force that could be mustered for war in times of emergency. The reserves, and presumably the professional army as well, were organized into units of 1,000, 100, 50, and 10. Joab, a specialist in siege warfare (2 Sm 20:15), commanded the professional army, and Amasa was over the citizens’ militia. David, however, remained commander-in-chief of the military organization.

The Israelite group in King David’s professional army was an outgrowth of the small band of fighting men who had served with him during the period of conflict with Saul. That veteran group consisted of David’s family and clansmen, and others who felt themselves oppressed by the central authority under Saul (1 Sm 22:1-2). It ranged in size between 400 and 600 men (1 Sm 22:2; 23:13; 27:2). The presence of mercenaries in David’s army is clearly recorded. Uriah the Hittite and Ittai of Gath are conspicuous examples, along with many career soldiers of Philistine origin, such as the Cherethites and the Pelethites under Benaiah (2 Sm 8:18; 15:19-22; 23:22-23).

The Davidic dynasty maintained a permanent mercenary army until 701 BC, after which it was considered too costly. The oppressive cost of maintaining a professional army, financed by burdensome taxes and forced labor, was in fact a major factor contributing to the disruption of the monarchy after Solomon’s death (cf. 1 Kgs 10:26-29; 12:4-19). After Sennacherib’s invasion in 701 BC, the southern kingdom of Judah depended entirely on a citizens’ militia for its defense. It is commonly held that the northern kingdom of Israel did not employ a professional army, but it is evident that King Ahab used at least some mercenary soldiers in his defense against Ben-hadad of Syria (1 Kgs 20:15-20).

God and War

Modern readers of the Bible often have difficulty with the military emphasis of the OT, asking, “How could God be a God of love and yet lead his chosen people into bloody wars?” The fact is that the Israelites were no more belligerent than the people who came before them or after them. God wanted to introduce new concepts of love and justice into the world through his people, but it was necessary for them to survive in order to do that. He did not take them out of their world—a world where resources were scarce and life precarious—but helped them fight for survival among far more brutal and acquisitive powers. Yet through the prophet Isaiah, God gave to his people the vision of a day when the art of warfare would be forgotten (Is 2:2-5).

The centuries that followed were characterized by a series of crises precipitated by intrigue and war. Persia, Macedonia, Parthia, and Rome successively established a military presence in the land. No display of military prowess, however, could dim the prophetic vision. No experience of an imposed peace could satisfy its terms. Indeed, Christians believe that at a time when Israel was under total military domination by Rome, God brought forth a Ruler, his Messiah, the “Prince of Peace,” to establish a peace that will never end (Is 9:6-7). The promise that nations will one day beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning hooks accounts for the rebirth of hope in the hearts of God’s people—even when war or the threat of warfare looms imminent, or when a nation’s leadership directs its attention to arms and warfare. The accomplishment of Isaiah’s prophecy ultimately depends not on the ingenuity or intention of human beings but on the will of the sovereign God.

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Tyndale Open Bible Dictionary